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RECENT CASE NOTES
BARRETT LAW BONDS-PREPAID ASSESSMENT.-Action was instituted to enjoin
the payment of Barrett Law Bonds as contemplated by the Treasurer of South
Bend. The City Treasurer filed a cross-complaint for the determination of
the rights, duties, and liabilities of the persons interested. Many property
owners had prepaid their instalments in order to free their property from
the assessment liens. This appeal involved the question of the city's relation
to the bondholders and property owners and liabilities for the funds so col-
lected but no longer available. Held: the city was not strictly a trustee for
either the bondholders or the property owners; and although not primarily
liable for the bonds originally, it was primarily liable for the full amount of
the assessments actually paid in. Read v. Beczmiewicz (Ind. 1939), 18 N. E.
(2d) 789, opinion modified on rehearing 19 N. E. (2d) 465.
The relationship created by the Barrett Law between the city, bondholders,
and property owners has been seldom analyzed. In the few cases where this
relationship has been considered, the question was either (1) whether the
bonds created liability of the city within the meaning of constitutional debt
limitations, or (2) whether the city would be liable to the bondholders if the
assessments were not collected after they had been levied. On the first ques-
tion, it has been held that the liability is not a primary liability of the city,
and so without the debt limitation. 1 On the second question, it has been held
that since the bondholders have been given the power to bring an action in
their own names to foreclose the liens on the property and collect the money,
the city is not liable if the money is not collected even where by the negli-
gence of the city there are defenses available to the property owner due to the
statute of limitations and the like.2 In most of these cases as well as in the
statute there is language which could be construed as holding the city a trustee
of the fund for payment of the bonds but in none is there a direct holding on
this point.3
However, there are cases in which, through the absconding of the agents of
the city with the funds, liability has been placed upon the city.4 The real
1 Quill v. City of Indianapolis (1890), 124 Ind. 292, 23 N. E. 788; Porter v.
City of Tipton (1895), 141 Ind. 347, 40 N. E. 802; Wilson v. City of Aberdeen
(1898), 19 Wash. 89, 52 P. 524; Robinson v. City of Valparaiso (1894), 136
Ind. 616, 36 N. E. 644; Dowell v. The Talbot Paving Co. (1894), 138 Ind. 675,
38 N. E. 389; The City of Huntington v. Force (1898), 152 Ind. 368, 53 N. E.
443; Spidell v. Johnson (1890), 128 Ind. 235, 25 N. E. 889.
2 Northwestern Lumber Co. v. City of Aberdeen (1900), 22 Wash. 404,
60 P. 1115; Porter v. City of Tipton (1895), 141 Ind. 347, 40 N. E. 802; Wayne
County Savings Bank v. The Gas City Land Co. (1901), 156 Ind. 662, 59 N. E.
1048.
3Vickrey v. City of Sioux City (1900), 104 F. 164; Farson v. City of Sioux
City (1901), 106 F. 278.
4 City of Bloomington v. Citizens National Bank (1914), 56 Ind. App. 446,
105 N. E. 575; Indiana Bond Co. v. Bruce (1895), 13 Ind. App. 550, 41 N. E.
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question under consideration is thus the relationship of the city towards both
parties. The assessment, like any tax, is made against the property owner
and creates a liability in favor of the city and a lien against the property.
The property owner in seeking to use the deferred payment plan waives all
defects in the method and procedure in the assessment and promises to pay the
assessment to the city, thus becoming personally liable for the money.5 There
is no agreement to pay the bondholders by the property owner and there is
thus created a relationship of debtor-creditor between the city and the property
owner. Hence the payment of the assessment to the city does not create any
agency or trust in the city but merely discharges the debt of the property
owner. Thus after payment of the assessment to the city according to the
provisions of the statute the property owner can no longer be liable. 6
In considering the relationship of the city to the bondholder both the statute
and the face of the bond are helpful. On the face of the bond the city
promises to pay a specific amount of money out of funds actually received
by the city from assessments on the property owners for the improvement for
which the bond was issued. This has not been held to be a primary liability
for debt limitation purposes since it is payable out of money to be collected,
and if none is collected the city is not liable.7  However, the problem in
the present case is the relationship after the money has actually been col-
lected. If the statute and bond are to be interpreted as making the city a
trustee for the collection and payment, then it is logical to say that the city
has only to use due care in collecting and investing the money, and any loss
without fault on the part of the city must fall on the bondholders. However, the
converse would follow that the bondholders would be entitled to any profit
made on the investment of the funds; and the bondholders would be entitled
to all income from the investments. Neither of these results is consistent
with the nature of the obligation. On the face of the bond, the city promises
to pay a specific amount at specific interest. Thus, the bondholder cannot claim
anything additional or be satisfied with anything less than the specific amount
promised to him; and this right is contingent only on the amount being col-
lected by the city. Once this contingency occurs, the liability of the city must
change from secondary to primary, and from that point the relationship between
city and bondholder is that of debtor and creditor. While the statute gives
the right to a bondholder to force the city to assess, collect, or foreclose the
lien in the name of the bondholders themselves, these rights can be regarded
only as security rights, and not as transferring the debt to the bondholders
by making the city agent or trustee for the bondholders.
958; City of Huntington v. Force (1898), 152 Ind. 368, 53 N. E. 443; Porter v.
City of Tipton (1895), 141 Ind. 347, 40 N. E. 802.
6 Wayne County Savings Bank v. The Gas City Land Co. (1901), 156 Ind.
662, 59 N. E. 1048; Quill v. City of Indianapolis (1890), 124 Ind. 292, 23
N. E. 788.
6 Voris v. Anderson (1917), 30 Idaho 15, 166 P. 213; City of Bloomington
v. Citizens National Bank (1914), 56 Ind. App. 446, 105 N. E. 575.
7 Northwestern Lumber Co. v. City of Aberdeen (1900), 22 Wash. 404, 60
P. 1115; Porter v. City of Tipton (1895), 141 Ind. 347, 40 N. E. 802.
8 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Carey Reed Co. (1939), 101 F. (2d)
602; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. City of Harrisburg (1894), 64 F. 283,
29 L. R. A. 401.
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Furthermore, it has been held by the Federal courts that for purposes of
taxation, the bonds of a city similar to this are actually obligations of the
city, and interest payments are not to be taxed by the United States. It may
be seen, therefore, that for purposes other than debt limitations, the bonds
may be considered obligations of the city.
Thus the words in the statute implying in some way that the city is trustee
for the bondholders are merely for the purpose of denying the city the right
to use these funds for other than payment of the bonds for which they are
collected and for segregation purposes in the city's duties, rather than in
changing the relationship between the city, bondholders, and property owners.
The court was clearly right in holding the city liable to the bondholders for
all the money collected in by prepayments which the city had lost by poor
investments and bank failures as well as the funds misappropriated to pay
other bondholders. W. E. B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-City ordinance provided that distribution of literature
within the city limits without permit from the City Manager constituted a
nuisance and could be punished as an offense against the city. Petitioner
distributed religious pamphlets within the city limits without the required
permit, and was convicted under the ordinance. She claimed the ordinance
prevented the free exercise of her religion, free speech and free press, and thus
was a violation of the fourteenth amendment. On appeal, reversed. Held: the
ordinance was invalid on its face obviating the necessity of obtaining a per-
mit. Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938), 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666.
The Constitution of the United States, as well as the Constitutions of the
several states, protect free speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of religious
worship. However, just as the right of assemblage is protected by the con-
stitutions, yet not made absolute,1 these constitutional guaranties are not
absolute.2 Where the restriction does not amount to a denial of the right and
is a reasonable exercise of the police power, the ordinance will be sustained. 3
Likewise, certain common law limitations existing at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution are valid.4  Thus, nuisances may be abated; 5 certain
1 Commonwealth v. Abrahams (1892), 156 Mass. 57, 30 N. E. 79; State v.
Frear (1910), 142 Wis. 320, 125 N. W. 961; People v. Young (1934), 136 Cal.
App. 699, 29 P. (2d) 4-40, discussed in 23 .California L. Rev. 180.
2 "Liberty of speech, and of the press, is also not an absolute right . .
Near v. Minnesota (1930), 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625; Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations (8th ed.), 876, 884; Frohwerk v. United States (1919), 249 U. S.
204, 39 S. Ct. 249; State v. McKee (1900), 73 Conn. 18, 46 A. 409, 49 L. R. A.
542; People v. Most (1902), 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175.
3 "The rights (free speech, free press, etc.) . . . are all subject to such
reasonable regulations as the governing body of the government may make for
the general good . . .," Thomas v. Indianapolis (1924), 195 Ind. 440, 145
N. E. 550, 35 A. L. R. 1194; Scheanck v. United States (1919), 249 U. S. 47,
39 S. Ct. 247; Near v. Minnesota (1930), 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625; Abrams
v. United States (1919), 250 U. S. 616, 40 S. Ct. 17.
4 Speaking of common law limitations on free speech, Ch. J. Parker of
Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Blanding (1825), 3 Pick. 304, said: "The
common law therefore is left unimpaired by the constitution . . .'; Jones v.
Townsend (1885), 21 Fla. 431 (libel); Atwood's Case (1617), 79 Eng. Repr.
359 (blasphemy) ; Rex v. Wilkes (1770), 98 Eng. Repr. 327 (obscene literature).
5 "The abatement of a nuisance, though infringing other rights, may be
